tor for the dev environment

This commit is contained in:
Riccardo Balbo 2024-10-26 01:28:07 +02:00
parent 18565200e6
commit 5a09c48e04
13 changed files with 3320 additions and 54 deletions

View File

@ -157,7 +157,8 @@ PERSISTENCE=1
SKIP_SSL_CERT_DOWNLOAD=1
# tor
TOR_PROXY=http://127.0.0.1:7050/
TOR_PROXY=http://tor:7050/
GRPC_PROXY=http://tor:7050/
# lnbits
LNBITS_WEB_PORT=5001

View File

@ -40,6 +40,18 @@ services:
labels:
CONNECT: "localhost:5431"
cpu_shares: "${CPU_SHARES_IMPORTANT}"
tor:
build:
context: ./docker/tor
container_name: tor
restart: unless-stopped
volumes:
- tordata:/tordata/
cpu_shares: "${CPU_SHARES_LOW}"
env_file: *env_file
healthcheck:
<<: *healthcheck
test: ["CMD-SHELL", "bash /tor.sh check"]
app:
container_name: app
stdin_open: true
@ -359,8 +371,13 @@ services:
healthcheck:
<<: *healthcheck
test: ["CMD-SHELL", "lncli", "getinfo"]
depends_on: *depends_on_bitcoin
depends_on:
tor:
condition: service_healthy
restart: true
<<: *depends_on_bitcoin
env_file: *env_file
entrypoint: /tor-entrypoint
command:
- 'lnd'
- '--noseedbackup'
@ -369,6 +386,7 @@ services:
- '--externalip=stacker_lnd'
- '--tlsextradomain=stacker_lnd'
- '--tlsextradomain=host.docker.internal'
- '--tlsextradomain=$${ONION_DOMAIN}'
- '--listen=0.0.0.0:9735'
- '--rpclisten=0.0.0.0:10009'
- '--rpcmiddleware.enable'
@ -394,6 +412,7 @@ services:
- "${STACKER_LND_GRPC_PORT}:10009"
volumes:
- stacker_lnd:/home/lnd/.lnd
- tordata:/home/lnd/.tor
labels:
ofelia.enabled: "true"
ofelia.job-exec.stacker_lnd_channel_cron.schedule: "@every 1m"
@ -618,3 +637,4 @@ volumes:
s3:
nwc_send:
nwc_recv:
tordata:

View File

@ -10,3 +10,6 @@ RUN apt-get update -y \
COPY ["./$LN_NODE_FOR/regtest/*", "/home/lnd/.lnd/data/chain/bitcoin/regtest/"]
COPY ["./$LN_NODE_FOR/tls.*", "/home/lnd/.lnd/"]
ADD tor-entrypoint.sh /tor-entrypoint
RUN chmod +x /tor-entrypoint

View File

@ -1,15 +0,0 @@
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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-----END CERTIFICATE-----

View File

@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
-----BEGIN EC PRIVATE KEY-----
MHcCAQEEIOxH9uY8mpnlo/X5gRAAVOzOuEPIAOuHHlezkba3vIuHoAoGCCqGSM49
AwEHoUQDQgAEE/58LzB2lQn3VWniIL/DCkvkhwEvXBJYn+16mu6rFbz4lu1Z4eDA
1RAZTOa4NJ5Gh+lde7Agt67Hvzqjy31WNQ==
-----END EC PRIVATE KEY-----

View File

@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
#!/bin/bash
ONION_DOMAIN=""
if [ -f /home/lnd/.tor/hidden_service/hostname ]; then
ONION_DOMAIN=$(cat /home/lnd/.tor/hidden_service/hostname)
fi
# expand the cmd arguments
args=$(echo "$@" | sed -e "s/\${ONION_DOMAIN}/$ONION_DOMAIN/g")
# Execute the original entry point script with the modified command line``
/entrypoint.sh $args

16
docker/tor/Dockerfile Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
FROM debian:bookworm
RUN apt-get update -y \
&& apt-get install -y tor bash openssl netcat-traditional privoxy \
&& apt-get clean \
&& rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/* /tmp/* /var/tmp/*
ADD torrc /etc/tor/torrc.template
ADD tor.sh /tor.sh
ADD services.conf /services.conf
ADD privoxy.conf /etc/privoxy/config
RUN mkdir -p /tordata && groupadd -g 1000 tor && useradd -u 1000 -g 1000 -m tor && chown -R tor:tor /tordata
EXPOSE 9050 9051 7050
VOLUME "/tordata"
USER tor
ENTRYPOINT [ "bash", "/tor.sh" ]

2848
docker/tor/privoxy.conf Normal file

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff

1
docker/tor/services.conf Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1 @@
HiddenServicePort 10009 stacker_lnd:10009

69
docker/tor/tor.sh Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
#!/bin/bash
function initialize {
####################### generate and save control password ########################
cp -f /etc/tor/torrc.template /tordata/torrc
TOR_PASSWORD=""
if [ -f /tordata/.env.torpass ]; then source /tordata/.env.torpass; fi
if [ -z "$torPassword" ]; then
TOR_PASSWORD=$(openssl rand -hex 32)
echo "TOR_PASSWORD=$TOR_PASSWORD" > /tordata/.env.torpass
fi
TOR_PASSWORD_HASH=$(tor --hash-password "$TOR_PASSWORD" 2>/dev/null | tail -n 1)
echo "Replacing %HashedControlPassword% with $TOR_PASSWORD_HASH"
sed -i "s|%HashedControlPassword%|$TOR_PASSWORD_HASH|g" /tordata/torrc
##################################################################################
}
function mergeServices {
cat /services.conf >> /tordata/torrc
}
# There is a circular dependency between tor and stacker_lnd:
# <-> tor needs stacker_lnd to be running to resolve the hidden service target
# <-> stacker_lnd needs to wait for tor to start and generate the hidden service address
# Afaik there isn't an "official" solution for this issue.
#
# This workaround starts tor the first time without the lnd hidden service
# and then re-start tor with the full configuration after the lnd service is ready.
if [ -f /tordata/start.timestamp ];
then
# Remove leftovers from a previous run
rm /tordata/start.timestamp
fi
if [ "$1" = "check" ];
then
if [ ! -f /tordata/start.timestamp ]; then
# if still initializing we just check if the hidden service was generated and use this as a healthcheck
if [ -f /tordata/hidden_service/hostname ]; then exit 0; else exit 1; fi
else
# run the real healthcheck
echo -e 'AUTHENTICATE "'$TOR_PASSWORD'"\nGETINFO status/circuit-established\nQUIT' | nc 127.0.0.1 9051 | grep OK || exit 1
exit 0
fi
else
# Step 1: we start tor with a fake hidden service that points to port 8080,
# just to get it to generate the hidden service data, then we kill it immediately after
echo "Initializing..."
initialize
tor -f /tordata/torrc &
pid=$!
sleep 60
kill $pid
# debug
ls /tordata/hidden_service/
# Step 2: we merge the service configuration and start tor again
echo "Starting tor..."
initialize
mergeServices
date +%s > /tordata/start.timestamp
privoxy --no-daemon /etc/privoxy/config&
tor -f /tordata/torrc
fi

260
docker/tor/torrc Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,260 @@
## Configuration file for a typical Tor user
## Last updated 28 February 2019 for Tor 0.3.5.1-alpha.
## (may or may not work for much older or much newer versions of Tor.)
##
## Lines that begin with "## " try to explain what's going on. Lines
## that begin with just "#" are disabled commands: you can enable them
## by removing the "#" symbol.
##
## See 'man tor', or https://www.torproject.org/docs/tor-manual.html,
## for more options you can use in this file.
##
## Tor will look for this file in various places based on your platform:
## https://support.torproject.org/tbb/tbb-editing-torrc/
## Tor opens a SOCKS proxy on port 9050 by default -- even if you don't
## configure one below. Set "SOCKSPort 0" if you plan to run Tor only
## as a relay, and not make any local application connections yourself.
SOCKSPort 0.0.0.0:9050 # Default: Bind to localhost:9050 for local connections.
#SOCKSPort 192.168.0.1:9100 # Bind to this address:port too.
#HTTPTunnelPort 127.0.0.1:7051
## Entry policies to allow/deny SOCKS requests based on IP address.
## First entry that matches wins. If no SOCKSPolicy is set, we accept
## all (and only) requests that reach a SOCKSPort. Untrusted users who
## can access your SOCKSPort may be able to learn about the connections
## you make.
#SOCKSPolicy accept 192.168.0.0/16
#SOCKSPolicy accept6 FC00::/7
SOCKSPolicy accept *
## Logs go to stdout at level "notice" unless redirected by something
## else, like one of the below lines. You can have as many Log lines as
## you want.
##
## We advise using "notice" in most cases, since anything more verbose
## may provide sensitive information to an attacker who obtains the logs.
##
## Send all messages of level 'notice' or higher to @LOCALSTATEDIR@/log/tor/notices.log
#Log notice file @LOCALSTATEDIR@/log/tor/notices.log
## Send every possible message to @LOCALSTATEDIR@/log/tor/debug.log
#Log debug file @LOCALSTATEDIR@/log/tor/debug.log
## Use the system log instead of Tor's logfiles
Log notice stdout
## To send all messages to stderr:
#Log debug stderr
## Uncomment this to start the process in the background... or use
## --runasdaemon 1 on the command line. This is ignored on Windows;
## see the FAQ entry if you want Tor to run as an NT service.
#RunAsDaemon 1
## The directory for keeping all the keys/etc. By default, we store
## things in $HOME/.tor on Unix, and in Application Data\tor on Windows.
#DataDirectory @LOCALSTATEDIR@/lib/tor
## The port on which Tor will listen for local connections from Tor
## controller applications, as documented in control-spec.txt.
ControlPort 127.0.0.1:9051
## If you enable the controlport, be sure to enable one of these
## authentication methods, to prevent attackers from accessing it.
HashedControlPassword %HashedControlPassword%
#CookieAuthentication 1
############### This section is just for location-hidden services ###
## Once you have configured a hidden service, you can look at the
## contents of the file ".../hidden_service/hostname" for the address
## to tell people.
##
## HiddenServicePort x y:z says to redirect requests on port x to the
## address y:z.
#HiddenServiceDir @LOCALSTATEDIR@/lib/tor/hidden_service/
#HiddenServicePort 80 127.0.0.1:80
HiddenServiceDir /tordata/hidden_service/
# Fake service just to initialize the hidden service directory
HiddenServicePort 8080 127.0.0.1:8080
################ This section is just for relays #####################
#
## See https://community.torproject.org/relay for details.
## Required: what port to advertise for incoming Tor connections.
#ORPort 9001
## If you want to listen on a port other than the one advertised in
## ORPort (e.g. to advertise 443 but bind to 9090), you can do it as
## follows. You'll need to do ipchains or other port forwarding
## yourself to make this work.
#ORPort 443 NoListen
#ORPort 127.0.0.1:9090 NoAdvertise
## If you want to listen on IPv6 your numeric address must be explicitly
## between square brackets as follows. You must also listen on IPv4.
#ORPort [2001:DB8::1]:9050
## The IP address or full DNS name for incoming connections to your
## relay. Leave commented out and Tor will guess.
#Address noname.example.com
## If you have multiple network interfaces, you can specify one for
## outgoing traffic to use.
## OutboundBindAddressExit will be used for all exit traffic, while
## OutboundBindAddressOR will be used for all OR and Dir connections
## (DNS connections ignore OutboundBindAddress).
## If you do not wish to differentiate, use OutboundBindAddress to
## specify the same address for both in a single line.
#OutboundBindAddressExit 10.0.0.4
#OutboundBindAddressOR 10.0.0.5
## A handle for your relay, so people don't have to refer to it by key.
## Nicknames must be between 1 and 19 characters inclusive, and must
## contain only the characters [a-zA-Z0-9].
## If not set, "Unnamed" will be used.
#Nickname ididnteditheconfig
## Define these to limit how much relayed traffic you will allow. Your
## own traffic is still unthrottled. Note that RelayBandwidthRate must
## be at least 75 kilobytes per second.
## Note that units for these config options are bytes (per second), not
## bits (per second), and that prefixes are binary prefixes, i.e. 2^10,
## 2^20, etc.
#RelayBandwidthRate 100 KBytes # Throttle traffic to 100KB/s (800Kbps)
#RelayBandwidthBurst 200 KBytes # But allow bursts up to 200KB (1600Kb)
## Use these to restrict the maximum traffic per day, week, or month.
## Note that this threshold applies separately to sent and received bytes,
## not to their sum: setting "40 GB" may allow up to 80 GB total before
## hibernating.
##
## Set a maximum of 40 gigabytes each way per period.
#AccountingMax 40 GBytes
## Each period starts daily at midnight (AccountingMax is per day)
#AccountingStart day 00:00
## Each period starts on the 3rd of the month at 15:00 (AccountingMax
## is per month)
#AccountingStart month 3 15:00
## Administrative contact information for this relay or bridge. This line
## can be used to contact you if your relay or bridge is misconfigured or
## something else goes wrong. Note that we archive and publish all
## descriptors containing these lines and that Google indexes them, so
## spammers might also collect them. You may want to obscure the fact that
## it's an email address and/or generate a new address for this purpose.
##
## If you are running multiple relays, you MUST set this option.
##
#ContactInfo Random Person <nobody AT example dot com>
## You might also include your PGP or GPG fingerprint if you have one:
#ContactInfo 0xFFFFFFFF Random Person <nobody AT example dot com>
## Uncomment this to mirror directory information for others. Please do
## if you have enough bandwidth.
#DirPort 9030 # what port to advertise for directory connections
## If you want to listen on a port other than the one advertised in
## DirPort (e.g. to advertise 80 but bind to 9091), you can do it as
## follows. below too. You'll need to do ipchains or other port
## forwarding yourself to make this work.
#DirPort 80 NoListen
#DirPort 127.0.0.1:9091 NoAdvertise
## Uncomment to return an arbitrary blob of html on your DirPort. Now you
## can explain what Tor is if anybody wonders why your IP address is
## contacting them. See contrib/tor-exit-notice.html in Tor's source
## distribution for a sample.
#DirPortFrontPage @CONFDIR@/tor-exit-notice.html
## Uncomment this if you run more than one Tor relay, and add the identity
## key fingerprint of each Tor relay you control, even if they're on
## different networks. You declare it here so Tor clients can avoid
## using more than one of your relays in a single circuit. See
## https://support.torproject.org/relay-operators/multiple-relays/
## However, you should never include a bridge's fingerprint here, as it would
## break its concealability and potentially reveal its IP/TCP address.
##
## If you are running multiple relays, you MUST set this option.
##
## Note: do not use MyFamily on bridge relays.
#MyFamily $keyid,$keyid,...
## Uncomment this if you want your relay to be an exit, with the default
## exit policy (or whatever exit policy you set below).
## (If ReducedExitPolicy, ExitPolicy, or IPv6Exit are set, relays are exits.
## If none of these options are set, relays are non-exits.)
#ExitRelay 1
## Uncomment this if you want your relay to allow IPv6 exit traffic.
## (Relays do not allow any exit traffic by default.)
#IPv6Exit 1
## Uncomment this if you want your relay to be an exit, with a reduced set
## of exit ports.
#ReducedExitPolicy 1
## Uncomment these lines if you want your relay to be an exit, with the
## specified set of exit IPs and ports.
##
## A comma-separated list of exit policies. They're considered first
## to last, and the first match wins.
##
## If you want to allow the same ports on IPv4 and IPv6, write your rules
## using accept/reject *. If you want to allow different ports on IPv4 and
## IPv6, write your IPv6 rules using accept6/reject6 *6, and your IPv4 rules
## using accept/reject *4.
##
## If you want to _replace_ the default exit policy, end this with either a
## reject *:* or an accept *:*. Otherwise, you're _augmenting_ (prepending to)
## the default exit policy. Leave commented to just use the default, which is
## described in the man page or at
## https://support.torproject.org/relay-operators
##
## Look at https://support.torproject.org/abuse/exit-relay-expectations/
## for issues you might encounter if you use the default exit policy.
##
## If certain IPs and ports are blocked externally, e.g. by your firewall,
## you should update your exit policy to reflect this -- otherwise Tor
## users will be told that those destinations are down.
##
## For security, by default Tor rejects connections to private (local)
## networks, including to the configured primary public IPv4 and IPv6 addresses,
## and any public IPv4 and IPv6 addresses on any interface on the relay.
## See the man page entry for ExitPolicyRejectPrivate if you want to allow
## "exit enclaving".
##
#ExitPolicy accept *:6660-6667,reject *:* # allow irc ports on IPv4 and IPv6 but no more
#ExitPolicy accept *:119 # accept nntp ports on IPv4 and IPv6 as well as default exit policy
#ExitPolicy accept *4:119 # accept nntp ports on IPv4 only as well as default exit policy
#ExitPolicy accept6 *6:119 # accept nntp ports on IPv6 only as well as default exit policy
#ExitPolicy reject *:* # no exits allowed
## Uncomment this if you want your exit relay to reevaluate its exit policy on
## existing connections when the exit policy is modified.
#ReevaluateExitPolicy 1
## Bridge relays (or "bridges") are Tor relays that aren't listed in the
## main directory. Since there is no complete public list of them, even an
## ISP that filters connections to all the known Tor relays probably
## won't be able to block all the bridges. Also, websites won't treat you
## differently because they won't know you're running Tor. If you can
## be a real relay, please do; but if not, be a bridge!
##
## Warning: when running your Tor as a bridge, make sure than MyFamily is
## NOT configured.
#BridgeRelay 1
## By default, Tor will advertise your bridge to users through various
## mechanisms like https://bridges.torproject.org/. If you want to run
## a private bridge, for example because you'll give out your bridge
## address manually to your friends, uncomment this line:
#BridgeDistribution none
## Configuration options can be imported from files or folders using the %include
## option with the value being a path. This path can have wildcards. Wildcards are
## expanded first, using lexical order. Then, for each matching file or folder, the following
## rules are followed: if the path is a file, the options from the file will be parsed as if
## they were written where the %include option is. If the path is a folder, all files on that
## folder will be parsed following lexical order. Files starting with a dot are ignored. Files
## on subfolders are ignored.
## The %include option can be used recursively.
#%include /etc/torrc.d/*.conf

53
sndev
View File

@ -524,6 +524,57 @@ USAGE
echo "$help"
}
sndev__help_stacker_lnd() {
help="
USAGE
$ sndev stacker_lnd get_cert get the tls cert
$ sndev stacker_lnd get_onion get the onion address
"
echo "$help"
}
sndev__stacker_lnd() {
shift
if [ -z "$1" ]; then
echo "no command provided"
sndev__help_stacker_lnd
exit 1
fi
if [ "$1" = "get_cert" ]; then
echo $(docker__exec -t stacker_lnd openssl base64 -A -in /home/lnd/.lnd/tls.cert)
elif [ "$1" = "get_onion" ];
then
onion="$(docker__exec -t stacker_lnd cat /home/lnd/.tor/hidden_service/hostname | tr -d '[:space:]')"
echo "$onion:10009"
fi
}
sndev__help_tor() {
help="
USAGE
$ sndev tor get_onion get the onion address
"
echo "$help"
}
sndev__tor() {
shift
if [ -z "$1" ]; then
echo "no command provided"
sndev__help_tor
exit 1
fi
if [ "$1" = "get_onion" ];
then
onion="$(docker__exec -t stacker_lnd cat /home/lnd/.tor/hidden_service/hostname | tr -d '[:space:]')"
echo "$onion"
fi
}
sndev__help() {
if [ $# -eq 2 ]; then
call "sndev__$1_$2" "$@"
@ -584,6 +635,8 @@ COMMANDS
stacker_lndcli lncli passthrough on stacker_lnd
stacker_clncli lightning-cli passthrough on stacker_cln
stacker_litcli litcli passthrough on litd
tor get_onion get the onion address
stacker_lnd get_cert get the tls cert
"
echo "$help"
}

View File

@ -4,6 +4,14 @@ For testing lnd as an attached receiving wallet, you'll need a macaroon and the
`stacker_lnd:10009`
## host and port (onion)
To get the onion address run this command:
```bash
sndev stacker_lnd get_onion
```
# generate macaroon
```bash
@ -12,14 +20,8 @@ sndev stacker_lndcli -n regtest bakemacaroon invoices:write invoices:read
# get cert
This is static in dev env so you can use this one:
To get the cert run this command:
```bash
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
```
Which is generated with the following command
```bash
openssl base64 -A -in docker/lnd/stacker/tls.cert
sndev stacker_lnd get_cert
```